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Kosovo and Beyond: Is Humanitarian 
Intervention Transforming International 
Society?
By Roberto Belloni
A review of Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in 
International Society by Nicholas J. Wheeler. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001. 352pp.
and
The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions edited 
by Ken Booth. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001. 386pp.
If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide [in Rwanda], a coalition of states had been 
prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should 
such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?
—Kofi Annan
The rising importance of global human rights is challenging long-established international 
relations and diplomatic principles, in particular the idea of non-intervention and non-interference in 
the domestic affairs of sovereign states. United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan has 
often referred to the resulting incoherence between emerging human rights norms that seem to 
permit external intervention when gross human rights violations are perpetrated, and the cardinal 
principle of the inviolability of sovereign states embodied in the UN Charter. Hence, efforts to 
defend human rights worldwide may give rise to curious problems and contradictions. For example, 
to cite a recent and controversial case, the 1999 NATO war against the Federal Republic of 
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Yugoslavia that was intended to protect the rights of the Kosovo Albanians may have been legitimate, 
but not legal.1 
As Nicholas Wheeler demonstrates in Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in 
International Society, the idea that human rights can be a legitimating reason for the instrumental 
use of violence has been very slow to emerge, vehemently contested, and sometimes denied even by 
intervening states. Through a meticulous analysis of major Cold War and post-Cold War cases, 
Wheeler has provided the best case to date for a “solidarist” approach to international politics that 
not only permits but also morally requires external military intervention in cases of supreme 
humanitarian emergencies.
In his edited book The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions, Ken Booth shows 
how much more debate is needed to reach a normative agreement resembling a “solidarist” 
perspective. By assembling a range of authors with different worldviews and approaches to 
international politics (including a chapter by Wheeler on the legality and legitimacy of NATO’s war 
in Yugoslavia), Booth provides an important analysis of the case that has sparked a renewed interest 
in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Booth’s own inclination, well expressed in his “Ten 
Flaws of Just Wars,” is skeptical of the desirability of intervention in the name of humanitarian 
principles, while Wheeler is clearly committed to advancing the idea that intervention reflects a new 
solidarity in the society of states. Both texts confirm and further the tradition of good scholarship 
arising from the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 
where the former serves as Head of the Department and the latter as Senior Lecturer.
International Order versus International Justice
Wheeler places his inquiry within the English School of international relations, which includes 
scholars such as E. H. Carr, Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, Adam Watson, R. J. Vincent, and 
especially Hedley Bull. What these authors share is the idea that international relations occur in a 
profoundly social context, a concept recently investigated in North America by social constructivists. 
Their axiomatic assumption furthers the notion proposed by early modern international lawyers 
(such as Hugo Grotius and Emmerich de Vattel) that states are bound by legal and moral obligations 
in their relations with each other. States form a society constituted by norms of sovereignty, non-
intervention and the rejection of the use of force. Such a society provides a context for order, and 
thus is logically and morally prior to other values, in particular human justice. Only after order is 
guaranteed, the logic goes, may individuals and groups enjoy their rights.
Within the English School, scholars are typically divided between pluralists and solidarists. 
Pluralists believe that states can agree only on a minimum set of rules of coexistence, in particular 
sovereignty and non-intervention. In their view, humanitarian intervention is a violation of these 
rules safeguarding the independent choices of other political communities, and is inherently open to 
1 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons 
Learned, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 (available at: www.kosovocommission.org). 
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the possibility of abuse by the strong trying to coerce the weak.2  Hence, pluralists reject intervention 
as ultimately subversive to the structure of inter-state order.
Solidarists, on the other hand, argue that intervention is a duty in cases of extreme human 
suffering. Intervention is thought to actually strengthen the legitimacy of the society of states and 
deepen its commitment to justice. Indeed, it is Wheeler’s central argument that pluralist suspicion of 
humanitarian intervention as conflicting with the requirements of order and coexistence is flawed. 
Instead, “there is often a compatibility between protecting the national interest, promoting 
international order, and enforcing human rights” (p. 309). The promotion of human rights and 
universal principles and values is slowly becoming part of conceptions of the “national interest.” In 
this account, then, states benefit in the long-run by promoting and enforcing human rights, because 
an unjust world will be a disorderly one. 
The manner in which Wheeler substantiates this claim is through an elaboration of a provocative 
solidarist theory of humanitarian intervention that distinguishes between degrees of legitimacy, 
combined with a careful examination of the leading Cold War and post-Cold War cases. To qualify 
as both legitimate and humanitarian, an intervention has to meet four key requirements, all derived 
from the Just War tradition (pp. 33-37): there has to be a “supreme humanitarian emergency” where 
the degree of human rights violations shocks the moral conscience of humanity; all reasonable 
peaceful remedies have been attempted; the use of force must be proportionate to the harm that it is 
designed to prevent or stop; and there has to be a strong expectation that the intervention will lead 
to a positive humanitarian outcome. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Wheeler claims that humanitarian motives for intervention 
are not necessary, provided that the means adopted do not jeopardize a positive outcome. Crucially, 
not every action can be justified in humanitarian terms. Borrowing from the work of constructivists, 
Wheeler claims that, “rules and norms both constrain and enable actors” (p. 6). An important part 
of these rules and norms are those that are verbally or legally endorsed by states in an attempt to 
legitimate their behavior. It is true that Western governments are often hypocritical and inconsistent, 
but ultimately for Wheeler this is a non-problem. States eventually become entangled in their own 
justifications. Thus, words matter. The verbal adherence to human rights principles can reinforce a 
normative framework empowering states to act as global cops (while simultaneously narrowing the 
range of possible actions legitimated by that framework).
The Cold War Context
Armed with this theoretical framework, Wheeler moves to an examination of post-World War II 
cases. What is striking during this period is the paucity of interventions. Despite the presence of 
hundreds of regimes guilty of systematic and persistent violations of human rights, interventions 
during the Cold War were clearly exceptional. It was widely accepted that the use of force to save 
2 An authoritative (and in many ways extreme) exposition of this view can be found in Robert Jackson, The Global 
Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
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victims from gross human rights violations was a breach of the UN Charter. The non-intervention 
rule led to the passive acquiescence of the slaughter of Tutsi in Burundi in the 1960s, of Ibos during 
Biafra’s war for secession from Nigeria in 1967, and the mass killing of East Timorese after 
Indonesia took over the island in 1975. 
Wheeler analyzes the three major cases when intervention did occur: India’s intervention in East 
Pakistan; Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda; and Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia. In the Cold 
War context of superpower rivalry and proxy wars, the society of states was clearly not prepared to 
approve these actions. For Wheeler, however, this is seen as a mistake. The society of states should 
have legitimated these interventions as humanitarian because they met the four threshold 
requirements of a legitimate action, while the means adopted did not alter a humanitarian result. In 
the case of India’s intervention, although non-humanitarian motives were certainly present, they did 
not impede achieving humanitarian outcomes. In the case of Vietnam, humanitarian reasons were 
not invoked but were clearly achieved by overthrowing the Pol Pot regime (which had been labeled 
by US President Jimmy Carter as the “worst violator of human rights in the world”). Only 
Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda was defended, at least in part, by humanitarian claims and often 
tacitly approved by the society of states. 
Hence, the lack of humanitarian motives does not necessarily jeopardize the possibility of 
positive outcomes. At first glance, Wheeler is correct in making this claim, although one might 
object that stripping motives altogether from the criteria for a just intervention fails to consider the 
realist view that states intervene only when the “national interest” clearly is involved. But for 
Wheeler this is not a problem as long as positive effects are achieved. There remains, then, the 
problem of defining a “humanitarian outcome.”
Wheeler is clearly content to follow the widely accepted idea that humanitarian intervention, 
when embarked upon, should be aimed at stopping massive violations of human rights (p. 37). He 
fails to appreciate that the conflicts that motivated external intervention are not simply human rights 
problems but political problems that require a political solution beyond the immediate cessation of 
human rights violations. Indeed, without a clear political solution, humanitarian crises are deemed to 
repeat themselves. In Uganda, for example, the overthrow of Idi Amin stopped massive killing but 
did not prevent the establishment of the second Obote regime, whose atrocities could be 
comparable to those of his predecessor. Had Tanzania had clearer humanitarian motives, perhaps 
Milton Obote (a protégé of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere) might have been prevented from 
taking power, or had his actions limited. In any case, Wheeler rules out motives as part of the 
requirements for an intervention to be humanitarian. The second Obote regime in Uganda is not 
even mentioned in Saving Strangers. 
Wheeler fails to consider motives and the way they affect political outcomes. If motives are 
largely non-humanitarian, then it is unlikely that the intervening states would be involved in any way 
in a post-war transition, because the principles that led to the intervention are only superficially 
altruistic. If, however, an intervening state decides to remain involved after a war that ended human 
suffering in the target state, then this is probably due to compelling national interests, as in the case 
of Vietnam’s lengthy occupation of Cambodia. In other words, there is much we can learn by 
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But Wheeler, by excluding motives from the key requirements for a just intervention, misses this 
important aspect. As a result, his theoretical framework lends itself to an ex-post-facto assessment of 
limited value concerning the authorization to intervene. The consequences are significant. In the 
case of Kosovo, Wheeler concludes that NATO’s intervention was flawed because of the means it 
adopted and the limited humanitarian results. Had Wheeler considered the claim that NATO’s 
action was designed mostly to boost its credibility, and less to protect human rights, the 
humanitarian catastrophe resulting from the war would be easier to comprehend.
The Post Cold War Environment: Kosovo and Beyond
In addition to the elaboration of a controversial set of criteria to qualify an intervention as 
humanitarian, Wheeler’s second major contribution is an empirical demonstration that despite 
lasting suspicion among many states, a “new norm of Security Council-authorized humanitarian 
intervention” was developed during the 1990s (p. 16). Although this may be true, the practice of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention continues to be viewed with great skepticism by the society of 
states, an opinion recently confirmed by the Report to the General Assembly of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.3 
Wheeler argues that unilateral intervention might support a new solidarity in international 
society and therefore should not be ruled out. The case of NATO’s bombing of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999, and the lively debate that arose as a consequence of 
this action, reflects the long road ahead to reach the “new solidarity” Wheeler hopes will be 
achieved.
The Kosovo Tragedy, edited by Ken Booth, provides a good example of the deep disagreements 
that have arisen on whether the war was legitimate, just, proportionate and effective in bringing 
about humanitarian results. As is often the case with edited books, some contributions are stronger 
or more illuminating than others. The article by Ambassador William G. Walker, the Head of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission 
(dispatched to Kosovo in November 1998 to monitor the human rights crisis), is as illuminating for 
what it says as for what it does not say. Ambassador Walker confidently claims that he is “certain 
that a thorough examination will prove, once and for all, that Kosovo was the scene of human rights 
abuses on a previously unimagined scale” (p. 138). One, however, looks unsuccessfully for hints of 
this evidence in the Ambassador’s article. The OSCE report Kosovo/Kosova—As Seen, As Told is not 
even mentioned by the Ambassador, although Part I of the report was meant to be used as evidence 
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in its indictment against 
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. 
Perhaps this gap is due to the fact that the lengthy report mentions only a single episode 
committed before OSCE observers were withdrawn to allow for NATO’s war to unfold: the massacre 
of 45 people in the village of Racak on 15 January 1999. As Dianne Johnston has shown in a series 
3 The Responsibility to Protect, December 2001 (available at http://www.iciss.gc.ca/menu-e.asp).
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of articles, all other allegations against the Serbian regime for crimes committed prior to NATO’s 
bombing have been largely unsubstantiated.4 Even the massacre of Racak—NATO’s casus belli— 
raises more questions than it answers, as candidly admitted by the OSCE. Still, Ambassador Walker, 
who during his assignment in El Salvador in the 1980s was completely oblivious to massacres, did 
not miss any opportunity to denounce the “genocide in the making.”
Of course, the problem is not with Ambassador Walker’s ambiguous behavior but with having 
enough evidence to legitimate an armed intervention against a non-NATO member—in other 
words, meeting Wheeler’s requirement of a “supreme humanitarian emergency.” Thankfully, the 
extent of human rights abuses in the province in the 1990s is richly documented in a variety of 
sources.5 Alex Bellamy provides a good overview of Serbian crimes by tracing the dynamics of 
Serb/Albanian confrontation back to the 1974 Yugoslav constitution. Other contributors to Booth’s 
volume argue that Serb discrimination and violence was evident enough to justify intervention. Chris 
Brown claims that the Yugoslav government was “grossly violating the human dignity and rights of 
the majority community in Kosovo” (p. 286). For Melanie McDonagh, “any understanding of our 
collective response to the situation in Kosovo must take account of the context of what went 
before, notably in Bosnia” (p. 290).6 
In addition to the presence of a considerable history of human rights abuses, one of NATO’s 
key reasons for intervening was evidence of a Serbian “final solution” to the Kosovo problem: a 
plan called “Operation Horseshoe,” in which Albanian Kosovars would be surrounded on three 
sides and driven through the gap into Albania. The German foreign minister disclosed the existence 
of the plan at the beginning of NATO’s bombing, but interestingly enough, as Eric Herring notes, it 
was never disclosed to the NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, whose job it was to 
counter it (p. 230). For this reason, many even doubt the plan ever existed. But even granting that 
past and future possible human rights violations in the province were enough to warrant an external 
intervention—and to most accounts they were—there remains the requirement of exhausting all the 
available peaceful remedies before resorting to violence.
The contributors to The Kosovo Tragedy are divided on this issue almost as much as they are 
on all other crucial topics. For Erring, the terms for a peaceful settlement put forward by NATO 
and rejected by the Serbs at Rambouillet in February 1999 were so unworkable as to reveal NATO’s 
unwillingness to reach a peaceful solution. Erring even quotes an off-the-record statement of then-
Secretary of State Madeline Albright that the US “intentionally set the bar too high for the Serbs to 
comply” (p. 228). 
Proponents of the bombing campaign claim that all reasonable means to avoid war were 
exhausted. Chris Brown argues that the idea that the US deliberately sabotaged the peace process 
relies on a number of “myths and misunderstandings” (p. 286), while Ambassador Walker claims 
4 See for example: Dianne Johnston, “Humanitarian War: Making the Crime Fit the Punishment,” in Tariq Ali, ed., 
Master of the Universe?, London: Verso, 2000.
5 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo , New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993.
6 However, the fact that Serbs have committed crimes during the several wars that preceded NATO’s campaign is a 
dubious legal ground upon which to justify intervention. The ICTY has indeed long resisted the prosecutor’s suggestion 
to reunify all counts against Miloseviæ in one single trial, implicitly making the case that the war in Croatia, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo do not easily reflect an underlying and comprehensive Serbian strategy.
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that “the Rambouillet peace process conclusively proved Slobodan Milosevic never intended signing 
any settlement that diminished his absolute control over Kosovo” (p. 139). In Saving Strangers, 
Wheeler echoes this idea by challenging NATO’s critics to “show that there was a non-violent 
strategy that could have established the conditions for the protection of human rights in Kosovo” 
(p. 283).
A conclusive answer to the question of NATO’s real intentions might never be found.7 This 
uncertainty leaves open the possibility, dreaded by pluralists, that intervention will upset the 
international order by weakening the restraints on the use of force and thus allowing the strong to 
coerce the weak. The solidarist challenge, then, is “to find ways of making unilateral humanitarian 
intervention an expression of the collective will of the society of states, and not a fundamental threat 
to its ordering principles” (Wheeler in Booth, p. 160). 
As Wheeler shows in Saving Strangers, NATO’s action might be considered as a step in this 
direction, since it was received with widespread approval within the society of states. But NATO did 
not act with the authorization of the UN Security Council, although it claimed that it was acting with 
the backing of international law. The authorization of the Security Council was not requested 
because Russia and China announced their intentions to veto it. Wheeler considers the possibility 
that NATO could have placed the issue before the General Assembly under the 1950 “Uniting for 
Peace” Resolution in order to secure collective legitimization for its actions. However, this would 
have posed the same problem that Kofi Annan raised in relation to the Council authorization, which 
was cited at the beginning of this essay: how could a group of states abstain from intervening if they 
could not grant the necessary votes in the General Assembly while massive human rights violations 
were taking place?
Wheeler correctly argues that there might be something fundamentally wrong in a system that 
requires states to break the law in order to “do good.” But, as Hilaire McCoubrey insists, it is not the 
illegality of the war but the character of the means employed by NATO that ultimately undermined 
the humanitarian ends of the intervention. NATO’s aim to achieve a “casualty-free” victory by 
dropping cluster bombs from 15,000 feet, and using depleted uranium tipped armor-piercing shells 
and missiles—while refusing to commit the ground troops that would have been otherwise 
required—led to the acceleration of Serb ethnic cleansing, not to mention avoidable civilian 
casualties among both Serbs and Albanians.8 Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
(among others) later documented these ostensible “mistakes” and “accidents,” although to date no 
legal proceeding for violations of the Laws of War has been opened.
7 However, partial truths are finally beginning to be revealed. In an interview with The Guardian  (21 July 2000) the former 
head of British intelligence disclosed that there were “many people within NATO anxious to go to war…the terms 
proposed to Milosevic at Rambouillet were deliberately unacceptable.”
8 This would include the death of at least 15 European peacekeepers from leukemia, in addition to many other cases of 
unexplained illness. In the winter of 2001, a Swiss laboratory found traces of uranium isotopes that suggests radioactive 
contamination from American-made munitions collected on Kosovar battlefields. NATO, however, argues that depleted 
uranium-tipped shells and missiles, after impact, cannot cause serious health problems.
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As Ian Mitchell and Jasmina Husanovic confirm, the post-war situation is marked by many 
unresolved problems that, taken together, hardly qualify the humanitarian status of the war’s 
outcome. Most Serbs have been expelled from Kosovo in a process sometimes called “reverse 
ethnic cleansing,” thus making a mockery of NATO’s claim that the war was about defending multi-
cultural values and practices. The few remaining non-Albanian minorities in Kosovo are constantly 
persecuted and threatened. Meanwhile, the lack of a clear final political settlement for the Kosovo 
province is a breeding ground for extremism from all sides. And the international community’s 
record in managing ethnic insecurity is, at the very least, shaky. 
Because of these flaws, Wheeler concludes that, “NATO’s intervention is not a good model of 
humanitarian intervention” (p. 275). Indeed, Western ineptitude and questionable motives continue 
to affect the post-conflict transition. The UN Mission to Kosovo has twice been left with almost no 
funds, while the deployment of the international police force has been painfully slow.9 In a highly 
symbolic move in August 2000, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), which 
received the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize for its work in war-torn areas, left the province to protest the 
UN’s incapacity to protect the safety of the few remaining minorities. Only the November 2001 
elections seemed to have given an encouraging sign with the victory of Ibrahim Rugova, the 
moderate Albanian leader. Rugova, however, immediately announced his intention to achieve the 
independence of Kosovo as soon as possible, an option opposed by most Western governments, 
and clearly in opposition to NATO’s stated goals. 
In sum, NATO’s experience in Kosovo provides grounds for two possible interpretations: either 
humanitarian intervention is not a useful tool to address states’ internal political problems and is 
hardly conducive to peace and order, or there is an inherent limitation in thinking of intervention as 
a short-term enterprise. If one subscribes to the former possibility, as many realists do, then 
intervention for humanitarian principles should be rejected altogether. The solidarist challenge, only 
partly met by Wheeler in Saving Strangers, is to think of intervention beyond short-term military 
action. Even if a military campaign were justified and successful, we still would need to identify 
institutions and mechanisms that are able to advance participation and shared responsibility for the 
future of those communities recovering from war.
Conclusion
The problems intrinsic to the idea that human rights values and practices can be defended 
through violent means are thoughtfully discussed in the last part of Booth’s volume, a forum 
significantly titled “Is Humanitarian War a Contradiction in Terms?” (with contributions by Chris 
Brown, Melanie McDonagh, John Stremlau, Colin S. Gray, Tarak Barkawi, Ken Booth, and Richard 
Falk). For Wheeler, however, just or humanitarian motives to wage war are ultimately secondary 
issues in determining whether an intervention qualifies for humanitarian status. We should rather 
acknowledge that states are increasingly adopting humanitarian arguments to legitimate their actions. 
In the 1990s, “even if officials in the Bush and Clinton administrations invoked humanitarian 
justifications only for ulterior reasons, they found themselves constrained in terms of their 
9 Roberto Belloni, “Faccia a faccia con la realta’: The Stati Uniti in Kosovo,” in Francesco Strazzari, ed., La pace 
intrattabile. Kosovo 1999/2000: radiografia del dopo-bombe, Trieste: Asterios, 2000, pp. 207-211.
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subsequent actions by the need to defend these as being in conformity with their humanitarian 
claims” (p. 288).
The idea that humanitarian arguments can legitimize (and at the same time constrain) states’ 
actions might be the most lasting contribution of Wheeler’s study of the evolution of solidarism in 
international politics, and is reflected in NATO’s stated reasons for intervening in Kosovo. The fact 
that a military alliance intervened in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state in defense of human 
rights (although with no UN authorization) established a very demanding normative framework to 
judge future states’ behavior. Whether this precedent represents a passage from pluralist to solidarist 
norms and behavior in international politics requires additional similar cases. The disagreements 
raised by NATO’s intervention, well represented in Booth’s volume, testify to the need for 
deepening the dialogue among all actors involved—states and non-states. Only an agreement on a 
set of substantive rules governing humanitarian intervention will counter the fear that intervention 
might continue to be the tool of the strong to coerce the weak.
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